“History remembers kings, not soldiers," retorted Agamemnon, the power-hungry King of the Mycenaeans, to Achilles, the legendary, persistent, courageously great warrior, whose presence tipped the scales in favor of the invading force in the conquest of Troy in 1193 B.C. This discourse between King Agamemnon and Achilles took place a couple of millennia ago. It provides us with the lesson that history does justice in remembering not only kings but also the heroism of individuals, irrespective of their status, according to the merit of the individual’s contribution and sacrifice. The histories of wars of independence relating to great nations across the globe and particularly our glorious war of liberation are replete with such brilliant examples. While retaining the insights of historical anecdotes, it is essential to take them further by connecting them to more empirical and realistic interpretations of the twenty-first-century social construct that our societies are striving to navigate safely.

Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military general, philosopher, and strategist, who is believed to have lived circa 500 B.C., wrote one of the greatest classics of military literature: “The Art of War.” In the third chapter, “Attack by Stratagem,” it is mentioned: “...hence, to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the achievement of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.” This aphorism emphasizes that at all times, be it peace, crisis, short of war, or war, in dealing with an external enemy or enemies from within, all involved in the decision-making loop ought to weigh their diktats according to this classical precept. While the armed forces of our beloved motherland deserve commendation for upholding our sovereignty from within and from without, over the last fifty-four years, the service to the nation by Bangladesh Navy (BN), a silent patriotic force, warrants a special mention, about which we, the commoners, remain unaware due to her ‘out of sight’ nature of operations deep inside our sea areas, which is almost equal to our mainland.

Hannibal (247–183 B.C.), a Carthaginian general and statesman, is often regarded as one of the greatest military strategists in history and one of the greatest generals of Mediterranean antiquity. This praise earned him a strong reputation in the modern world, and he was regarded as a great strategist by Napoleon as well. He was forced to invade Italy through land because, after the First Punic War (264–241 B.C.), ‘naval supremacy’ had essentially shifted to the Romans and an invasion by sea was far too hazardous. To supply Hannibal by sea became an impossibility. History has witnessed severe consequences such as ‘defeat’ despite the tactical brilliance on the ground of a celebrated general when the political leadership lacks in their maritime vision!

Despite being one of the greatest military minds in the history of warfare, Napoleon (1769-1821) had his weaknesses that caused him disastrous defeat at Waterloo in 1815, at the hands of General Wellington, who came from the other side of the English Channel. What was the weakness of a military genius of his stature? Out of about seventy-eight maxims of Napoleon, the first one was, “The frontiers of states are either large rivers, chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and broad rivers occupy the third place.” A critical inquiry of the list of obstacles that were coined by the great emperor can identify his failure to learn from the mistakes of Hannibal, whom he also considered one of the greatest strategists. He failed to understand the existential importance of maritime security. His grand army neglected the Royal Navy (RN). “Nelson’s far-distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the world.” He ignored the sea—the English channel that was right in his backyard. It is argued in scholarly discourses that the lack of ‘ocean literacy’ of the great captain caused him utter defeat!

Queen Elizabeth I (1558 to 1603) is recorded to consider the RN as a strategic resource: “It is the Navy whereon, under the good providence of God, the wealth, peace, and safety of this country doth chiefly depend!” This was believed to be truer than ever by Admiral Fisher, the first Sealord of RN in 1914 under the Admiralty of Winston Churchill. He had himself reportedly said the ominous word: “If the Navy is not supreme, no Army, however large, is of the slightest use. It’s not invasion; we have to fear if our Navy is beaten; it’s starvation! What’s the good of an army if it has an empty belly?” His reforms of the strategic resource—the RN—ensured its dominance during WWI. In his book "La Guerre Navale," Rear Admiral Hubert Moineville, French Navy, examined many doctrinal issues. Some of them even influenced the US Navy doctrine during the Cold War. One such issue was using conventional or general-purpose navy forces, where he compared the ubiquity of the surface ship operation to that of foot soldiers. If the Admiral were to now look into the "track charts" [the actual lines of operational patrol marked on maps used by Naval ships] of more than five decades of BN operations in the Bay of Bengal, particularly our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), he could be amazed that his theory has turned to a fact in Bangladeshi waters.

“To develop the right kind of fleet, the nation needs to understand the navy’s purpose,” asserts Dr. Nicholas Lambert, a Mahanian of the first order. Likening Lambert, this author is also of the opinion that despite the transformation of BN to a three-dimensional force, thanks to the maritime vision of the experts, much more is needed to be done for the sake of national interest—for the blue economy, for the blue diplomacy, for the blue security in a realist world. As Thucydides to ‘Realism’, Mahan is to ‘Maritime Strategy.’ A close exegesis of Mahan’s writings demands to overturn the popular idea of Mahan as a “combat battle fleet man.” Rather, as argued by Lambert, “Mahan, especially in his later writings, made a compelling case for a broader economic perspective.” Actually, “Mahan became a pioneering thinker about the importance of naval power in a globalized world economy.” As an enthusiastic admirer of Mahan’s focus on “the role of naval power in facilitating—or deranging—international trade,” and as an old-timer of BN, this writer would emphatically argue that “Strategic purpose is not the same thing as operational necessities.” Navies are historically strategic instruments at the disposal of the state. They are employed to protect and help the nation to extract strategic resources’ to secure not only commerce, and sponsor blue diplomacy, but will also be the ‘ways’ and'means’ to bring the triumphant ‘ends,’ ‘the wealth, peace, safety, and security of the nations.’

Since the historic war of independence in 1971, there have been many maritime ‘Aha’ moments for Bangladesh. The seminal moments include the visionary Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, l974, ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which was opened for signature in 1982, and entered into force in 1994, resolving Bangladesh's maritime disputes with India and Myanmar peacefully through ITLOS and PCA, where Bangladesh gained 118,813 km2 of maritime area in the BoB in 2012 and 2014 respectively, successful execution of “Gunboat Diplomacy” in couple of occasions safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 24/7/365 patrolling of the rough seas by strategic resource-the BN, thus, silently preserving the maritime interests of our country that passed the test of time.

In all these maritime accomplishments, as per the ‘Rules of Business’ of the Bangladesh Government, the concerned organizations and ministries are believed to have contributed. But it wouldn’t be wrong to make special mention of the vital role played by the Maritime Affairs Unit (MAU) of MOFA and the Bangladesh Navy for rendering selfless silent service for the nation, remaining beyond public visibility. For they have understood the inner purport of the vast opportunities offered by the BoB and that ‘all our fortunes are at sea.’ All these accomplishments, initiatives, and actions to let Bangladesh gradually rise above poverty and social inequality, despite intrigue and evil design against 175 million people and the little speck of land they lovingly call Bangladesh, are pointers to illustrate Sun Tzu's'supreme excellence’ of subduing the potential enemy without fighting.

In light of the above recounting, let us be inspired to learn from the history to avoid tactical brilliance at the cost of strategic defeat. Let us build Bangladesh Navy as a strategic resource enabler to translate national interests into national prosperity as we all so dearly desire. If someone still needs stimulant to be convinced about the strategic significance of a strong navy, let them also remember what the first President of the United States of America, George Washington, said: “It follows then, as certain as that night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything honorable and glorious.”

Writer: Commodore Syed Misbah Uddin Ahmad, (C), NUP, ndc, afwc, psc, BN (retd), Director General, Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD). Email: misbah28686@gmail.com