"Strong institutions, not strongmen, are the real guardians of a nation's freedom."
— A thematic paraphrase of Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom (2003).
From post-independence aspirations to a cyclical political reality
Episode Two ended with a portrait of war-torn Bangladesh, trying to rebuild a national identity grounded in constitutionalism, social justice, and collective memory. However, the new state immediately faced famine, political factionalism, weak bureaucratic structures, and intense geopolitical pressure.
Episode Three continues this path by exploring how Bangladesh, like many postcolonial states with fragile institutions, experienced repeated cycles of democracy and dictatorship—patterns shaped by colonial legacies (Khan 2013), the political inheritance of Pakistan (Sisson and Rose 1990), and the structural weaknesses of a young state fighting for both legitimacy and survival.
Where Episode One explained the breakdown of unity in Pakistan and Episode Two described the fragile rebuilding of a new republic, Episode Three examines how that republic became stuck in oscillations between civilian and military control, between participatory hopes and authoritarian temptations. This is not a story of democratic failure, but of a nation repeatedly reclaiming its agency amid immense historical burdens.
The assassination of 1975 and the structural shock to the Republic
The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 15 August 1975 was the most unexpected in Bangladesh's early political history. Besides removing the founding leadership, it also challenged the normative foundation of the new state, leading to a series of coups, counter-coups, and institutional fragmentation, Lawrence Lifschultz wrote in "Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution" (1979).
The unpredictable and intense cycle of action, reaction, and counteraction of events, whether orchestrated from within or outside, from mid-August to the first week of November 1975, cannot be precisely documented. However, it must be felt emotionally, driven by genuine patriotic passion. Colonel Taher's intervention and the rise of General Ziaur Rahman were warmly welcomed by the majority, illustrating how the military—initially marginal in formal politics—became the primary arbiter of national stability. The constitutional promise made in 1972, however, did not fully reflect the people's aspirations and conflicted with an emerging reality where the survival of the state seemed clearly to depend on direct military management.
The overthrow of the founding constitutional order revealed the core institutional weakness noted by Willem Van Schendel in "A History of Bangladesh" (2009): the lack of strong democratic safeguards capable of enduring political shocks.
The Zia era: Reframing nationalism and reimagining the state
General Ziaur Rahman aimed to restore stability by promoting political pluralism and redefining ideology. His concept of "Bangladeshi nationalism" sought to expand national identity beyond the ethnolinguistic roots of 1971 by incorporating religious, territorial, and cultural dimensions, Talukder Maniruzzaman said in "Military Withdrawal from Politics" (1992). This expanded the political arena but also created a structural paradox: a predominantly civilian system supported by military influence.
This pattern resembled postcolonial political trajectories elsewhere, where weak institutions enabled military-bureaucratic governance, according to David Lewis in "Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society" (2011).
Zia's assassination in 1981 further highlighted the dangers of personalised leadership in institutionally fragile contexts and reinforced the cyclical fragility that marked the political system throughout the 1980s.
The Ershad regime: Military-style governance and regulated democracy
General HM Ershad's 1982 coup reinforced militarised governance. His administration promoted decentralisation through the upazila system, expanded infrastructure, and implemented Islamisation policies—including the 1988 constitutional declaration of Islam as the state religion. These policies were presented as reforms to strengthen the nation, but in reality, they served to consolidate power, Amena Mohsin argued in "The Politics of Nationalism and Security in Bangladesh" (2020).
Media constraints, co-optation of political elites, and bureaucratic manipulation created what Ali Riaz describes in "Rethinking Bangladesh" (2019) as a "managed political order". However, widespread civic resistance gradually grew stronger. The mass uprising of 1990, driven by student groups, civil society, professional bodies, and both major political parties, proved that authoritarian entrenchment was limited by popular mobilisation.
This was a crucial demonstration of Bangladesh's democratic instinct: authoritarianism could be challenged when society united.
The return of electoral democracy: Promise and paradox
The 1991 election marked the restoration of parliamentary democracy and sparked hopes for institutional consolidation. However, the rivalry between the BNP and the Awami League quickly took over political life. Parliament became confrontational; boycotts, hartals, and agitation politics hindered legislative work, according to Richard Sisson and Leo E Rose's "War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh" (1990). Bureaucratic neutrality was weakened, and policy continuity was compromised.
Sheikh Hasina's 1996 government expanded social development programmes, improved human development indicators, and deepened selective diplomatic engagement. The nation, however, was divided in an attempt to capitalise on the spirit of the 1971 Liberation War and the vengeance of the 1975 assassination of her family. Nonetheless, structural shortcomings persisted: institutions became more politicised, and democracy continued to operate within a confrontational rather than consensual framework (Lewis 2011).
The 2007–2008 emergency interregnum: Reformist ambition and structural constraints
The political deadlock of 2006 led to the 2007–2008 emergency government, widely seen as supported by the military and presented as a corrective measure. It aimed to tackle corruption, reform political parties, and reduce polarization, argued M Matiur Rahman in "Bangladesh in the Mirror: An Outsider Perspective on a Struggling Democracy" (2012).
Although the interim government initially enjoyed public backing, it lacked what is often called constitutional legitimacy and faced constraints typical of non-elected authority. Its reformist goals ultimately collided with institutional inertia. When elections were reintroduced in 2008, democracy was revived, but the underlying tensions between political competition and institutional weakness persisted.
Democracy under complete civilian control: Majoritarian stability and its discontents (2009–2024)
From 2009 till August 2024, Bangladesh experienced continuous civilian governance under the Awami League. This period is recognised for rapid GDP growth, unprecedented infrastructure development, and technological progress. However, as research increasingly indicates, these developmental achievements have occurred alongside significant political centralisation, which has limited freedom of speech and encouraged institutional corruption.
Ali Riaz demonstrates that democratic practices gradually weakened as electoral competition declined and political institutions became more subordinate to executive control. Amena Mohsin observes the increasing securitisation of governance, reflected in limited civic space and the systematic suppression of dissent. David Lewis contends that Bangladesh's hybrid governance model—combining developmental achievements with diminished democratic space—became more apparent during this period.
A pivotal moment was the 2009 BDR mutiny, which S Mahmud Ali describes in "Understanding Bangladesh" (2010) as both a profound national trauma and a catalyst for reforming the security sector. This shift enhanced the state's coercive power and was marked by increased surveillance, stricter media controls, and a surge in allegations of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, writes Naomi Hossain in "The Aid Lab: Understanding Bangladesh's Unexpected Success" (2017).
By the early 2020s, the political landscape had become heavily majoritarian, centralised, and securitised. Concerns grew over corruption, elite patronage networks, and external influence on strategic policy decisions. This configuration—developmental dynamism combined with shrinking democratic space—ultimately proved unsustainable.
The 2024 Monsoon Revolution, a widespread, inclusive, and largely peaceful civic mobilisation led by Gen Z, reflected broad demands for participatory governance, electoral integrity, and institutional accountability. It marked the end of the state's long experiment with centralised majoritarianism and despotic tyranny.
Majoritarianism and the Khaldunian Cycle of Decline
Fourteenth century Arab scholar Ibn Khaldun's theory of state formation and decline provides a powerful perspective for analysing the weaknesses of majoritarian political systems. In the Muqaddimah, he states that the resilience of any polity relies on Ê¿asabiyyah—the social cohesion and shared purpose that unite diverse groups into a functioning political community.
Majoritarian governance, by favouring the numerical majority and marginalising dissenting or minority groups, undermines this collective solidarity and replaces consent-based legitimacy with partisan control. Ibn Khaldun also warns that systemic injustice, mainly when expressed through coercion, discriminatory policies, and the suppression of opponents, "brings about the ruin of civilisation". In majoritarian systems, the concentration of power often results in political exclusion, administrative bias, and the weakening of institutional checks—factors that hasten the state's structural fragility.
Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun observes that the later stages of a regime are marked by excess, corruption, dependence on sycophants, and the substitution of moral authority with force. These patterns closely resemble the evolution of modern majoritarian politics, where the concentration of power and the politicisation of state institutions lead to fragile governance reliant on coercive force rather than widespread legitimacy. As Ê¿asabiyyah diminishes, elites fracture, institutions lose independence, and public trust declines, creating the very conditions for decay and rupture that Ibn Khaldun identified centuries ago. His analysis thus highlights a timeless truth: regimes that weaken social cohesion and institutional justice ultimately foster the forces that cause their own collapse, and the fall of Sheikh Hasina's government is a vivid example of what Ibn Khaldun envisioned centuries ago.
Comparative reflection: A regional mirror with Pakistan
Bangladesh's political cycles reflect aspects of Pakistan's trajectory—military intervention, personalised leadership, and administrative fragility. However, Bangladesh diverged significantly: it avoided prolonged military dominance after 1990, maintained constitutional continuity, and upheld stronger macroeconomic performance (Van Schendel 2009; Riaz 2019).
These distinctions open up chances for a more pragmatic bilateral engagement in the future, centred on strategic interests rather than historical grievances. This will be examined in detail in Episode Four.
Institutional lessons: Why the cycle persists
The persistence of Bangladesh's political oscillations stems from systemic weaknesses:
· politicisation of state institutions;
· confrontational political culture;
· absence of bipartisan consensus on national priorities;
· personalised rather than institutional political authority.
As Steven Wilkinson ("Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence", 2015) argues in the South Asian context, civil–military balance requires strong institutions and political norms that Bangladesh has struggled to develop. Nevertheless, the country has demonstrated remarkable resilience: it maintained territorial integrity, avoided major sectarian conflict, and experienced steady economic growth. The challenge ahead is to base political stability on institutional strength rather than on individual dominance.
Moving towards a reclaimed sovereign horizon
Episode Three marks a decisive transition in Bangladesh's political narrative. The nation's journey through alternating phases of democratic aspiration and authoritarian consolidation reflects not failure, but the resilience of a society that repeatedly resists permanent despotism.
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