The maxim "friendship to
all, malice towards none" has been a recurring touchstone in Bangladeshi
diplomacy, widely invoked by statesmen since independence.
The phrase, while politically resonant, is not a literal constitutional clause. Bangladesh's constitutional commitment to peaceful coexistence appears explicitly in Article 8 (principles of state policy) and Article 25 (duty to promote international peace).
In practice, however, prudence and reciprocity must guide foreign policy: when neighbouring actions structurally harm vital interests, doctrinal goodwill alone is insufficient. Recent scholarship and policy analyses, therefore, urge a calibrated realism that preserves the spirit of "friendship" while protecting national autonomy, Syed Mahbub Ali wrote in "Cold War in the Indian Ocean: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent" (2010).
Regardless of its exact textual origin, the slogan evolved into a guiding principle that shaped the young republic's foreign policy. However, neighbours' behaviour, the pressures of great-power rivalry, and domestic political shifts—most notably the July 2024 monsoon revolution, which transformed the political landscape—have reignited debate over whether Bangladesh can continue relying on a moralistic approach that may have compromised its national interests.
This debate is not about abandoning restraint or adopting hostility but about reconciling normative aspirations with realpolitik, the pragmatic logic historically used by weaker states to survive in contested regions.
The realist problem: When friendship Is not reciprocated
Bangladesh's geopolitical position—situated between India and the Bay of Bengal, neighbouring Myanmar, and exposed to extra-regional powers—renders it particularly susceptible to asymmetric coercion. Structural realist theorists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer emphasise that small and medium-sized states must carefully calibrate their diplomacy to maintain autonomy within an anarchic international system (Mearsheimer 2001). Bangladesh's experience corroborates this: when neighbouring countries undertake unilateral actions that negatively impact Bangladesh's interests, adhering strictly to a non-confrontational foreign policy becomes strategically perilous.
For decades, Bangladesh has experienced recurring crises stemming from its neighbourhood. A few notable examples include:
• Border killings of unarmed civilians, disproportionately carried out by India's Border Security Force (BSF), despite repeated promises of "zero tolerance." (India: Investigate Alleged Border Force Killings," HRW, 9 Feb 2021).
• Water-sharing disputes, including the unresolved Teesta treaty, which remains hostage to Indian domestic politics, according to Daanish Mustafa's "Hydropolitics in South Asia" (2019).
• Media narratives and disinformation campaigns portray Bangladesh unfavourably during crucial diplomatic moments.
• Pressure on defence and foreign policy autonomy, originating during the 1972–1974 period, when the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace raised concerns among foreign-policy scholars about potential constraints on Dhaka's strategic independence (Ali 2010).
Indian scholars, such as Sreeradha Datta and C Raja Mohan, observe that Delhi has historically regarded Bangladesh's foreign and defence policies as "extensions of Indian security concerns". Pakistani scholars like Hassan Askari Rizvi in "Bangladesh in the Mirror of International Relations" (1993) and Ziauddin Ahmed in "Bangladesh in the Mirror of International Relations" (2000) argue that the early decades of Bangladesh-India relations were shaped more by structural dominance than by equal partnership.
Researchers affiliated with the Asiatic Society have also noted that, although the 1972 treaty included cooperative language, the power imbalance created "a psychological dependence that weakened Dhaka's diplomatic leverage for years" (Asiatic Society of Bangladesh 2016).
However, Bangladesh, despite these structural pressures, upheld a foreign policy ethos that saw friendship as the default and believed that reciprocity would ultimately follow. The issue is that realism warns that friendship is not an international currency of lasting value; interests are.
Did the founding vision imply realpolitik?
The idea that Bangladesh must always stay peaceful is often justified by pointing to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. However, Mujib's diplomacy was more nuanced. His speeches to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN General Assembly emphasised peace. Nonetheless, he also declared that Bangladesh would "stand firm against any injustice done to our people" (UNGA Speech, 1974).
His government built relationships with the Soviet bloc, sought Chinese recognition despite Beijing's initial hostility, and engaged in complex manoeuvring within the Islamic world. These are all elements of traditional small-state realpolitik—balancing, bandwagoning where necessary, and strategic hedging.
Therefore, the argument is that the founding philosophy was never pacifist. It was, at best, pragmatic idealism with realist guardrails or footrails. The slogan, as interpreted today, appears to oversimplify the original strategic flexibility.
Why the debate intensified after 2024
One cannot deny that the upheaval of July 2024, popularly called the "monsoon revolution," marked a watershed moment. It exposed severe tyranny, governance injustice, institutional corruption, deliberate division of the population, and centralised, one-way management of foreign relations.
Policy elites, patriotic citizens, and young political enthusiasts are increasingly questioning whether Bangladesh has become overly accommodating to certain powers at the expense of the national interest. The Indo-Pacific environment—characterised by strategic rivalry, weaponised interdependence, and maritime militarisation—has further complicated the situation.
Amid this debate, a provocative proposal has emerged to change the slogan to "Friendship to friends only". Critics argue that this breaches diplomatic norms; diplomacy, they contend, is specifically directed at transforming non-friends into allies.
However, supporters counter that unconditional friendship is unsustainable when a partner or neighbour persistently and repeatedly undermines Bangladesh's interests. The solution, therefore, lies not in emotionally biased slogans but in a realpolitik-based recalibration of policy aligned with global strategies for small states, such as those of Singapore and Vietnam.
The Indo-Pacific outlook: A case of premature alignment?
Bangladesh's Indo-Pacific Outlook (IPO), announced in April 2023, was aimed at demonstrating a commitment to openness, connectivity, and a rules-based order. However, many analysts—Bangladeshi, Indian, Western, and Pakistani—agree that the IPO was vague, hastily drafted, and reflected pressure to align with a specific geopolitical camp (Ali 2021; Islam 2024).
Syed Mahmud Ali, arguably the most authoritative Bangladeshi scholar on strategic diplomacy, argued that small states should avoid "premature alignment" in the Indo-Pacific, as such alignment risks entangling them in dependence on and retaliation from rival powers (Ali, Understanding Bangladesh, Hurst, 2010).
The IPO aimed for neutrality but lacked strategic clarity, which made Bangladesh vulnerable to misinterpretation. For example:
· The United States may read it as quiet support for a free-and-open Indo-Pacific, indirectly linking it to Chinese containment.
· China may interpret it as hedging and expect Dhaka to clarify its position.
Bangladesh ultimately aimed to reassure everyone simultaneously, a common risk for small states without a clearly defined realist doctrine. Indian analysts such as Harsh Pant argue that Bangladeshi ambiguity frustrates Indian maritime and continental strategy (Pant 2022). Pakistani writers argue that the IPO implicitly aligns with the US-India bloc, undermining Dhaka's balanced relations with Beijing (Khan in "Small States and Alignment in the Indo-Pacific", 2023).
Western scholars observe the lack of mechanisms linking the IPO to actual implementation, rendering it more rhetorical than strategic Raffaello Pantucci wrote in "International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Commentary" (2024). In brief, the IPO became a mirror reflecting Bangladesh's struggle to harmonise moralistic slogans with high-stakes realpolitik.
Why realism—not hostility—should guide Bangladesh now
A realist foreign policy does not mean antagonism; it means interest-based reciprocity. The foreign policy recalibration for Bangladesh should be debated to ascertain that Bangladesh:
• Expects cooperative behaviour from neighbours and partners.
• Reminds diplomatic costs for harmful actions.
• Strengthens autonomy in defence and foreign affairs.
• Diversifies partnerships so that no single state becomes indispensable.
• Aligns with Indo-Pacific realities without becoming a pawn in great-power rivalry, i.e. maintains strategic equidistance.
Realism is especially vital in the Bay of Bengal, where military capabilities, maritime surveillance, and competition in the blue economy are rapidly increasing. As Ali notes, "Bangladesh sits on a geopolitical fault-line where the choices of small states determine whether they survive as autonomous actors or function as strategic appendages" (Ali, Understanding Bangladesh, 2010).
Rethinking the slogan itself
Should Bangladesh retain or revise its founding foreign policy slogan?
Arguments for retaining it include:
1. It reinforces moral standing and soft power.
2. It signals non-aggressive intent, helping with global partnerships.
3. It aligns with Bangladesh's constitutional values.
Arguments for modifying it:
1. It promotes one-sided expectations of friendship.
2. The slogan fails to reflect the stricter Indo-Pacific reality.
3. It is often misused to justify diplomatic passivity.
4. It is not textually anchored as a constitutional obligation.
Given both the arguments for and against, a balanced reform could preserve its spirit while embedding realism—for example: "Friendship with all, firmness against injustice." Or "Cooperation with partners, sovereignty above all." These reflect both realism and constitutional principles without provoking unnecessary backlash.
Policy Options for a Proactive, Realist Foreign Policy
1. Institutionalise strategic autonomy. Bangladesh must manage relations with India, China, and the United States based on interests, not expectations of so-called "friendship". Like Vietnam, Bangladesh should adopt a "four-no doctrine":
· No submissive foreign policy,
· No formal alliances,
· No siding against any state,
· No foreign military bases.
2. Revisit the Indo-Pacific outlook. The IPO should be rewritten with:
· clear strategic objectives,
· alignment with blue economy priorities,
· seeking IPEF membership,
· realistic maritime security commitments,
· and non-alignment explicitly stated.
3. Diversify defence cooperation. Bangladesh must avoid overdependence on any supplier. This aligns with realist doctrines used by Indonesia and the UAE. Strategic autonomy requires:
• US, European, and Türkiye defence diversification,
• continued access to Chinese platforms,
• conditional cooperation with India, Pakistan or any other country of national interest,
• technology-focused engagement with Japan and South Korea.
4. Establish a water diplomacy commission. Water sharing must be elevated to an existential priority. Bangladesh should engage:
• international river-basin law experts,
• UN Watercourses Convention mechanisms,
• third-party mediation if bilateral efforts stall.
5. Expand blue-economy realism. Realists understand that sovereignty at sea is sovereignty at home. Bangladesh requires:
• indigenous maritime surveillance,
• seabed resource mapping,
• naval modernisation aligned with protecting maritime national interest,
• partnerships based on capability, not symbolism.
6. Strengthen public diplomacy against disinformation. Bangladesh must not tolerate persistent maligning by neighbouring media. A professional strategic communication unit is essential for countering narratives and protecting the national image.
Conclusion: Towards a mature, realist bangladeshi foreign policy
Bangladesh's foreign policy must adapt—not discard its moral aspirations, but root them in realpolitik suitable for a vulnerable, high-stakes region. The country cannot afford further slogans that are seen as mere expressions of unconditional goodwill, especially when reciprocity is lacking. Nor should it draft strategic documents, such as the Indo-Pacific Outlook, without anchoring them in clear interests and thorough analysis.
To safeguard its people, borders, rivers, economy, and maritime future, Bangladesh must adopt a foreign policy that remains courteous in tone but steadfast in defending its national interests. Friendship is desirable; strategic autonomy is essential.
Bangladesh today stands at a strategic crossroads, much like many emerging nations, facing a pivotal choice between naivety and strategic maturity. While its people are inherently peace-loving, history shows that they will not tolerate oppressive rule. Those who doubt this need only consult the writings of Abul Fazl, one of the foremost scholars in Emperor Akbar's court. Realism affirms this enduring truth.
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