"Great men make history, but only such history as it is possible for them to make. Circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances."
—CLR James, The Black Jacobins (1963 edition).
From the unfulfilled promise to a new republic
Episode One ended with the central irony of Pakistan's founding: that a state envisioned as a democratic, pluralistic homeland for South Asia's Muslims became, within a few years of Jinnah's death, a highly centralised entity marked by authoritarian decision-making, military dominance, and the political marginalisation of its eastern majority.
Those contradictions—between promise and practice, between unity and inequity—created the structural fissures that ultimately pushed East Pakistan towards a new conception of nationhood.
Episode Two begins precisely when the idea of Pakistan collapses and a new state, Bangladesh, emerges from war, moral conviction, and profound human sacrifice. If Episode One described the failure of Pakistan's political imagination, Episode Two recounts Bangladesh's struggle to convert the moral legitimacy of liberation into the institutional legitimacy of governance.
It is a story of aspiration tested by adversity: devastation, famine, misgovernance, Cold War pressures, and the complex challenge of defining national identity while managing relations with Pakistan—relations shaped by painful memories and pragmatic geopolitical realities.
The ashes of liberation: Confronting a fractured reality
The victory of December 1971 secured sovereignty but left Bangladesh physically shattered and institutionally hollow.
The departing Pakistani forces left behind destroyed bridges, burned villages, dismantled factories, and a collapsed transport system. The economy—already structurally weak before the conflict—was devastated, with industrial output crippled and agricultural production severely disrupted.
Nearly 10 million refugees required urgent rehabilitation, while law and order remained precarious in the chaotic aftermath of the war. At the administrative level, the state was skeletal: most senior West Pakistani civil servants had fled or been repatriated, leaving a bureaucracy unable to meet the demands of reconstruction (Van Schendel 2009; Ali 2015; Sisson and Rose 1990).
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returned to Dhaka in January 1972 to lead a country united emotionally but institutionally fractured. His moral authority was immense, but the scale of the challenge was daunting. The new government's priority was reconstruction—restoring agriculture, restarting industries, rehabilitating refugees, and drafting a constitution that embodied the ideals of the liberation struggle.
The 1972 Constitution enshrined nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism as fundamental principles, reflecting the wartime aspiration that Bangladesh would be an inclusive and egalitarian state.
However, circumstances constrained Mujib from the outset. The bureaucracy had little experience running an independent state; political factions within the Awami League competed for influence; international assistance was vital but conditional; and the global Cold War pushed Bangladesh into choices it did not fully control.
These same structural realities shaped the early contours of Bangladesh–Pakistan relations, which were defined by moral distance but geopolitical interdependence.
The struggle for justice, recognition, and diplomatic positioning
The pursuit of justice for the atrocities committed during the 1971 war was one of the earliest and most sensitive challenges faced by the emerging Bangladesh. In early 1972, Dhaka announced its intention to prosecute 195 Pakistani military officers for genocide and crimes against humanity—officers then held by India as prisoners of war (POWs) under the Geneva Conventions, Gary J Bass wrote in "The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide" (2013).
Recognising the significant diplomatic influence of holding these POWs, India refused to hand them over to Bangladesh without a broader regional settlement that would serve its own strategic interests in post-war South Asia.
The Simla Agreement of 1972 between India and Pakistan significantly changed this diplomatic landscape. Negotiated and signed without Bangladesh's participation, the accord formalised bilateralism as the main framework of India–Pakistan relations, thereby weakening Bangladesh's ability to directly influence issues related to its own war and demands for accountability, according to Richard Sisson and Leo E Rose's "War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh" (1990).
Importantly, the Simla Agreement laid the foundation for future negotiations in which the fate of the POWs—and thus Bangladesh's capacity to pursue trials—would be subordinated to Indo-Pakistani détente.
Complicating this situation was Pakistan's initial refusal to recognise Bangladesh. Political leaders in Islamabad faced intense domestic pressures: the army denied any suggestion of misconduct, conservative politicians feared the electoral backlash from concessions, and the emotionally charged issue of the "stranded Pakistanis"—the Urdu-speaking Bihari community that had shown loyalty to Pakistan during the war—sparked fierce public controversy (Rahman 2019). Pakistan argued that diplomatic recognition should be separated from questions of war crimes accountability or responsibility for the Biharis; meanwhile, Bangladesh viewed recognition and accountability as closely linked parts of a moral and legal reckoning.
A significant breakthrough occurred in 1974 when Pakistan officially recognised Bangladesh, following pressure from Muslim-majority countries and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), especially after Bangladesh was invited to attend the Lahore Islamic Summit, writes S Mahmud Ali in "Understanding Bangladesh" (2015).
While recognition was symbolically vital for Bangladesh's international standing, it did not resolve the underlying disputes. The more persistent challenges—issues of historical memory, legal justice, citizenship for the Biharis, and the conflicting narratives of 1971—remained unresolved, affecting bilateral relations for many years.
This early diplomatic struggle highlighted the core tension Bangladesh faced as a new nation: asserting its moral and political rights on the international stage while simultaneously strengthening domestic governance and national unity. It also outlined the shape of the future Bangladesh–Pakistan relationship—one influenced not by nostalgia or sentiment but by structural geopolitical realities.
These realities included India's regional dominance, the strategic importance of the Muslim world, and the unavoidable political complexities that Bangladesh and Pakistan inherited from a shared yet contested history.
The search for legitimacy: Mujib's vision and its limitations
Despite enjoying significant moral authority and popular legitimacy following independence, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's government faced increasing structural and political challenges. Bangladesh's wartime destruction—coupled with the sudden departure of Pakistani civil servants and the collapse of administrative institutions—had already resulted in a fragile governance context.
By 1973–74, economic pressures grew: inflation rose, food shortages worsened, and political violence continued, including armed activities by remaining Mukti Bahini members and radical leftist groups such as the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) and the Sarbahara movement, Talukder Maniruzzaman wrote in "Bangladesh Politics: Secular and Islamic Trends", published in Asian Survery in 1980.
Bureaucratic inefficiency, a lack of skilled administrators, and the tendency towards centralised decision-making further created governance bottlenecks.
The famine of 1974 became both a humanitarian disaster and a significant political shock for the nation. While floods, disruptions to global grain supplies, and hoarding played crucial roles, scholars broadly agree that failures in domestic governance worsened the crisis, Amartya Sen wrote in "Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation" (1981). The loss of public trust, rising lawlessness, and the state's inability to maintain order drove the government towards political restructuring.
In January 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman introduced the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), effectively replacing the multiparty system with a one-party structure.
His stated aim was to streamline governance, discipline political competition, and accelerate economic recovery. Academic interpretations of BAKSAL vary: some argue it was a desperate yet pragmatic attempt to stabilise a collapsing state; others view it as a move towards authoritarian centralisation that restricted political participation.
The cumulative effect of corruption and injustice by the ruling party and their immediate family members, economic hardship, political fragmentation, ideological conflict, and increasing mistrust among sectors of the military and political elite made the state more fragile.
These pressures ultimately resulted in the tragic assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 15 August 1975—a rupture that greatly destabilised Bangladesh and interrupted its early democratic progress.
The rise of Ziaur Rahman: Reorienting the state
In the turbulent months following Mujib's assassination, Bangladesh endured coups and counter-coups, highlighting the fragility of its political institutions. From this chaos, General Ziaur Rahman emerged as a prominent figure, a highly popular statesman, gradually consolidating power and guiding the country towards relative stability.
Zia's approach differed markedly from Mujib's. He reintroduced multiparty politics, promoted political pluralism, and established the foundation of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). His political ideology articulated a broader view of Bangladeshi nationalism, emphasising Islamic cultural identity and distancing the state from India's political sphere, Maniruzzaman wrote in "The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1987–1990", published in Pacific Affairs in 1992. This shift responded to popular opinion but also enabled Bangladesh to adopt a more independent foreign policy framework.
Zia's economic reforms steered the country towards market liberalisation, private-sector involvement, and rural development. His decentralisation efforts bolstered local governance and diversified political influence. However, his leadership remained heavily reliant on military authority, and political institutions stayed weak.
Diplomatically, Zia's tenure marked the normalisation of Bangladesh–Pakistan relations. By setting aside the emotional legacy of 1971 in favour of current national interests, Zia promoted pragmatic engagement through the OIC, SAARC, and bilateral diplomacy. Pakistan, still facing internal challenges, found in Bangladesh a partner in multilateral forums, especially those linked to the Muslim world.
This period laid the groundwork for what could be called strategic pragmatism—a realisation that, despite historical trauma, Bangladesh's geopolitical interests demanded engagement rather than isolation.
Zia's tenure ended in tragic fashion as, on 30 May 1981, he was assassinated by a faction of army officers in an attempted coup.
General Ershad and the persistence of institutional fragmentation
General Hussain Muhammad Ershad's 1982 takeover, which removed a democratically elected government, continued the pattern of military-led rule. His regime promoted administrative decentralisation and focused on infrastructural expansion, presenting these measures as the basis for long-term stability. The most symbolic act of his rule was the 1988 constitutional amendment declaring Islam the state religion—an effort widely seen as a strategy to boost political legitimacy by aligning the nation's identity with the majority's religious sentiments, according to Ian Talbot's 2012 book "Pakistan: A Modern History" (2012).
Although contentious, this shift subtly diminished some of the cultural and emotional distance from Pakistan that characterised Bangladesh's early post-independence years, when secular nationalism was partly emphasised in contrast to Pakistan's Islamic identity. Simultaneously, Ershad continued and refined Ziaur Rahman's strategy of diversified diplomacy, balancing relations among India, Pakistan, and China while pursuing autonomy in regional power dynamics.
Civil–military relations: Lessons from The Army and the Nation
The political volatility of post-1975 Bangladesh can be better understood when placed within a broader South Asian context. Shuja Nawaz's The Army and the Nation (2016) demonstrates how deeply rooted colonial legacies—particularly the martial-race doctrine, institutional separation from civilian authority, and bureaucratic-military alliances—shaped Pakistan's civil–military relations, eventually normalising periodic military interventions.
Bangladesh inherited similar institutional structures in 1971, yet its development diverged significantly. After the reinstatement of parliamentary democracy in 1991, Bangladesh gradually reduced direct military control over formal political spheres, even as its democratic practices remained adversarial, centralised, and susceptible to partisan conflicts.
Viewed comparatively, the Bangladesh–Pakistan experience offers a key insight: although their political paths diverged after the 1970s, both nations continued to grapple with similar structural issues—fragile institutions, politicised security forces, and competing narratives of national identity. As each state sought stability and strategic influence within a volatile region, its bilateral relations increasingly reflected the logic of strategic realism rather than the emotional weight of historical grievances.
Bangladesh–Pakistan Relations: Between Memory and Geopolitical Necessity
By the late 1980s, Bangladesh and Pakistan had shifted from hostility to cautious cooperation. The unresolved historical issues—such as acknowledgement of wartime atrocities, the fate of the Bihari community, and conflicting national narratives—still posed obstacles. However, structural forces drove both nations towards more measured engagement: trade opportunities, shared Islamic forums, and common concerns about regional security dynamics.
Bangladesh's foreign policy, which became more independent and pragmatic after 1975, engaged Pakistan not only diplomatically but also through broader Muslim-majority platforms. Pakistan, for its part, recognised the importance of maintaining constructive ties with Dhaka, even if political sensitivities limited deeper reconciliation.
Thus, Episode Two concludes with Bangladesh, whose political development remained turbulent but whose statehood was established, and with Pakistan, which acknowledged Bangladesh's permanence while dealing with its own internal political challenges. The relationship between the two countries was no longer solely defined by history but was increasingly shaped by regional geopolitics.
Toward Episode Three: Cycles of democracy and despotism
As Bangladesh entered a new democratic era in 1991, the country faced new challenges: political polarisation, recurring confrontations between major parties, and tensions between democratic aspirations and authoritarian tendencies. Pakistan experienced a similar sequence of unstable civilian governments marked by ongoing military dominance.
Episode III will examine these parallel trajectories, analysing how recurring democratic openings and authoritarian reversals shaped each state's political culture, foreign policy, and strategic outlook. The episode will also evaluate how Bangladesh and Pakistan navigated their bilateral relationship amid shifting regional alignments, including the rise of India, China's growing influence, and the evolving strategic architecture of the Indo-Pacific.
0 Comments
Post a Comment