Ganges Water Sharing Treaty: Episode One
A three-part series ahead of the 2026 treaty renewal
Following a timely roundtable discussion on the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty organised by Dhaka Stream on 30 September 2025, it became clear that Bangladesh is approaching a critical point in its river diplomacy.
The discussion, aptly titled "Ganges Talk: UN Water Convention 1994", brought together experts from legal, strategic, environmental, and civil-society backgrounds, all focusing on one concern: the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty will expire in 2026, and its renewal cannot be seen as just a routine bureaucratic task.
As Dhaka Stream later reported, participants collectively called for the mobilisation of the entire state apparatus—foreign policy, defence planning, technical agencies, and civil society—to shape Bangladesh's negotiating stance. Inspired by this shared sense of urgency, this three-part series aims to take the Ganges debate beyond conference rooms and fully engage it in public discourse and policymaking.
Episode One revisits the origins and development of the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, positioning it within the historical inequalities that have long shaped upstream–downstream relations between India and Bangladesh.
What Is the 1996 Ganges treaty?
Few bilateral agreements have significantly influenced Bangladesh's environmental security as the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty. Signed between India and Bangladesh on 12 December 1996, the treaty governs the allocation of dry-season flows of the Ganges at the Farakka Barrage from 1 January to 31 May each year. Its stated aim was to ensure minimum flows for both parties—particularly Bangladesh, as the lower riparian—while accommodating upstream development needs (United Nations Treaty Collection, 1978).
The treaty followed decades of dispute over the Farakka Barrage, which India unilaterally commissioned in 1975 and that significantly changed the natural flow of the Ganges during the dry season. According to the treaty's allocation formula, river discharge is measured at 10-day intervals at Farakka. When flows are at or below 70,000 cusecs, the waters are shared equally. When flows are between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh is assured 35,000 cusecs, with the remaining allocated to India. When flows exceed 75,000 cusecs, India may withdraw up to 40,000 cusecs, with the rest continuing downstream to Bangladesh. During the critical lean period from 11 March to 10 May, the treaty establishes a rotational system in which both sides alternate receiving 35,000 cusecs in 10-day blocks.
Analytically, the treaty remains a narrowly defined volumetric allocation mechanism at a single control point. It neither guarantees ecological flows in Bangladesh nor accounts for cumulative upstream abstractions, sediment dynamics, or the health of distributaries such as the Gorai. Furthermore, it lacks adaptive mechanisms to address climate variability or basin-wide hydrological change—limitations that have become increasingly apparent.
Current situation
Almost 30 years on, amid growing climate challenges, salinity intrusion, and dry-season shortages, the treaty remains a crucial test of fair transboundary river governance in South Asia. As the 2026 expiry approaches, both nations are in a review and renegotiation phase, making this moment strategically critical.
Bangladesh has proposed forming a Joint Technical Committee with three members from each side to facilitate the renewal process. Dhaka has also indicated a preference for a longer-term renewal, emphasising that predictability and stability are vital for water management and development planning. India appears receptive to renewal but remains mindful of domestic and state-level interests, particularly in West Bengal.
Bangladesh's main demands include securing higher guaranteed dry-season flows—potentially increasing allocations to 40,000 cusecs during critical periods—along with expanding cooperation on shared rivers such as the Dharla, Dudkumar, Gomati, Khowai, Monu, and Muhuri. Enhanced data sharing, joint monitoring, flood forecasting, and cooperative river management are also key aspects of Bangladesh's proposals.
India, for its part, seeks adjustments that address its needs for irrigation, navigation, and power generation, while remaining cautious about commitments that could limit upstream development. These conflicting priorities arise amid growing hydrological uncertainty caused by climate change.
Empirical studies show that dry-season discharge in the Ganges significantly decreased during the treaty period (1997–2016), exacerbating salinity intrusion and ecological stress in southwest Bangladesh (Rahman et al., 2019). Reduced flows in the Ganges–Gorai system have been directly linked to inland salinisation extending over 100 kilometres during extreme dry years, with severe impacts on agriculture, drinking water, and livelihoods (Gain & Giupponi, 2014; Mirza, 1998).
What the future may look like
Before projecting forward, it must be acknowledged that the Ganges Treaty has implications far beyond water management. For Bangladesh, it intersects with food security, public health, ecological resilience, and national security — hallmarks of non-traditional security threats facing deltaic states.
A revised allocation framework that boosts Bangladesh's dry-season share would provide clear ecological and socio-economic advantages, though opposition may emerge in upstream Indian states. A longer-term treaty could ensure stability, but only if paired with adaptive review mechanisms to manage climate-induced hydrological changes. Expanding the treaty's scope to include more rivers would encourage basin-wide governance, though it would also add to technical and administrative complexity.
Equally important are provisions for real-time data sharing, joint monitoring, and enforceable dispute resolution mechanisms. Without transparency and compliance safeguards, even well-crafted treaty clauses risk weakening in practice. The integration of minimum environmental flow standards and climate adaptation triggers would further bolster treaty resilience, but would require political will and technical consensus.
Outlook
The Ganges Treaty is likely to be renewed before December 2026, albeit with revisions. Bangladesh enters negotiations with moral, legal, and practical leverage as the lower riparian facing existential risks. Incremental gains—such as enhanced data sharing, adaptive clauses, and modest increases in guaranteed dry-season flows—appear achievable. The broader inclusion of additional rivers may begin institutionally, even if full agreements develop gradually.
Ultimately, the renewal will signal whether South Asia can move beyond rigid volumetric sharing toward climate-resilient, basin-wide cooperation. For Bangladesh, equitable access to the Ganges is not a matter of diplomatic convenience but of ecological survival, economic continuity, and sovereign dignity in a changing climate.
As this inaugural episode has demonstrated, the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty is more than just a technical agreement involving cusecs and schedules; it is the outcome of a long-standing and uneven upstream–downstream relationship shaped by power, geography, and political choices.
Yet, history and hydrology alone cannot fully account for the vulnerabilities inherent in Bangladesh's position. Beneath the treaty lies a deeper question: to what extent are unilateral upstream interventions—most notably the Farakka Barrage—compatible with the principles of international water law governing shared rivers? Addressing this question requires moving beyond diplomacy into legal analysis.
Writer: Commodore Syed Misbah Uddin Ahmad, (C), NUP, ndc, afwc, psc, BN (retd), Director General, Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD). Email: misbah28686@gmail.com
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