The debate over the Bangladesh Navy’s future in the coming decades is no longer about fleet size alone; it is fundamentally a question of strategic imagination. Amid widening conflict around the Strait of Hormuz, instability near Bab el-Mandeb, intensifying great-power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, and the persistent vulnerability of maritime trade even in peacetime due to piracy, Bangladesh can no longer afford to confine its naval vision to the Bay of Bengal. As Geoffrey Till argues, modern navies are no longer instruments of war alone; they are instruments of national policy, economic security, and strategic influence.

For too long, strategic thinking in Bangladesh has been constrained by what may be termed maritime minimalism, the assumption that naval responsibilities begin and end near the immediate coastline. This perspective overlooks a basic reality: Bangladesh’s maritime interests extend far beyond its territorial waters. Alfred Thayer Mahan long ago argued that national prosperity is inseparable from secure maritime commerce, and that insight is increasingly relevant. Bangladesh’s economic lifeline depends upon uninterrupted sea lines of communication stretching from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia.

Robert D Kaplan has described the Indian Ocean as the strategic centre of the twenty-first century, where energy flows and great-power competition converge

The crude oil that powers industry, LNG that fuels electricity generation, fertiliser that sustains agriculture, and raw materials that underpin manufacturing all pass through vulnerable chokepoints thousands of miles from Chittagong (Chattogram). Disruption in these routes can quickly translate into domestic instability. The seizure of the Bangladeshi-flagged MV Abdullah by Somali pirates in 2024 was a stark reminder that maritime threats to national security can emerge far from home waters. As Julian Corbett observed, the purpose of naval power is not only to win battles but to secure the sea communications upon which national life depends.

Instability involving Iran and tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have reinforced this lesson. Such disruptions already strain global energy markets. For a trade-dependent economy like Bangladesh, which relies heavily on imported fuel and maritime commerce, these developments underline the need for a broader naval outlook. Robert D Kaplan has described the Indian Ocean as the strategic centre of the twenty-first century, where energy flows and great-power competition converge. Bangladesh must therefore see itself not as a coastal observer but as a maritime stakeholder.

Large blue-water ambitions must not come at the expense of littoral readiness

This requires a shift in policy from a narrowly coastal navy towards a more layered maritime security posture capable of operating across three zones: coastal waters, the exclusive economic zone, and key sea lanes beyond the Bay of Bengal. This reflects the thinking of Ken Booth, who described navies as simultaneously performing military, diplomatic, and constabulary roles.

At the core of this transformation lies a doctrinal challenge: balancing threat-based and capability-based planning. Threat-based planning responds to identifiable risks such as piracy, trafficking, illegal fishing, and regional instability. Capability-based planning, by contrast, prepares for uncertainty by developing adaptable platforms, resilient command structures, and flexible doctrine. A modern navy requires both. Overreliance on threats risks reactivity; exclusive focus on capability risks unsustainable cost. As Eric Grove argued, smaller maritime powers must align ambition with national means while preserving strategic intent.

Contemporary conflict also demonstrates that weaker states can impose costs on stronger adversaries through Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies. For Bangladesh, this implies investment in layered coastal defence rather than direct competition with larger navies. Shore-based anti-ship missiles, mines, integrated maritime surveillance, unmanned systems, and coastal radar networks could significantly enhance deterrence in the northern Bay of Bengal. For smaller maritime states, asymmetry is not a weakness; if properly designed, it can be a strategic asset.

Maritime affairs are still often treated as peripheral, despite the fact that more than 90 per cent of Bangladesh’s trade moves by sea

Bangladesh’s shallow littoral waters and irregular coastline further reinforce the need for a geography-driven force structure. Large blue-water ambitions must not come at the expense of littoral readiness. Fast attack craft, mine countermeasure vessels, marine commandos, and amphibious response units remain essential for protecting ports, offshore installations, and coastal communities. Geography must remain central to naval design, particularly for regional navies operating in confined waters.

Naval power, however, is not defined by combat alone. Modern navies perform multiple functions: warfighting, diplomacy, constabulary enforcement, and humanitarian assistance. Bangladesh’s exposure to cyclones, flooding, and climate-related disasters ensures that the navy will continue to play a vital role in disaster relief and humanitarian response. The same platforms that secure sovereignty in wartime can save lives in peacetime.

Naval diplomacy is equally significant. Port visits, joint exercises, and regional cooperation strengthen Bangladesh’s role in Indo-Pacific maritime networks. Engagement with partners across SAARC, BIMSTEC, ASEAN, and beyond, including Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and the European Union, can enhance interoperability while preserving strategic autonomy. As James Holmes notes, presence itself is a form of influence, and even modest navies can generate strategic effects through sustained engagement.

A persistent challenge remains the problem of sea blindness in national policy discourse. Maritime affairs are still often treated as peripheral, despite the fact that more than 90 per cent of Bangladesh’s trade moves by sea. The blue economy offers substantial potential in ports, shipping, fisheries, offshore energy, seabed resources, and maritime logistics. Without adequate maritime security, however, these opportunities remain exposed to risk.

Technological change offers an opportunity for more efficient naval modernisation. Artificial intelligence can improve maritime domain awareness, predictive maintenance, and operational planning. Autonomous systems, including aerial, surface, and underwater drones, can enhance surveillance at relatively low cost. The future navy need not be larger; it must be more intelligent, adaptive, and integrated.

Fiscal constraints are real and cannot be ignored. Bangladesh cannot, and should not, emulate major naval powers. The objective must be a mission-specific navy aligned with geography, economic needs, and strategic priorities. Every procurement decision should answer a simple question: does it strengthen the protection of Bangladesh’s maritime interests? If not, it is a secondary priority.

Bangladesh’s maritime future cannot be secured by focusing solely on its coastline. Its economic and strategic fate is tied to wider waters, from the Bay of Bengal to the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. These distant chokepoints may appear remote, yet they are directly connected to the country’s economic lifeline. The question is no longer whether Bangladesh needs a stronger maritime vision, but whether it can afford continued delay.

For Bangladesh, the sea is no longer a distant frontier; it is increasingly the arena in which national security, economic stability, and strategic relevance will be determined. The Bangladesh Navy must therefore evolve beyond inherited assumptions to meet emerging realities across the Indo-Pacific. The central challenge is not simply one of capability, but of imagination. 

 

Writer: Commodore Syed Misbah Uddin Ahmad, (C), NUP, ndc, afwc, psc, BN (retd), Director General, Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD). Email: misbah28686@gmail.com