The Arakan Army’s rise means Dhaka can’t rely on old diplomatic protocol to secure borders

The management thinker Peter Drucker warned that the greatest danger during turbulence is not the turbulence itself, but acting with outdated logic. Bangladesh faces exactly this challenge at its border with Burma (Myanmar) today.

For decades, Dhaka’s approach rested on a traditional diplomatic doctrine: all meaningful engagement must pass through the internationally recognised government in Naypyidaw. Whether dealing with border security, maritime friction, cross-border crime, or the Rohingya crisis, state-to-state diplomacy was the default setting. But as physical control on the ground in Rakhine State slides away from the military junta, those old assumptions are becoming impossible to justify.

Geopolitical tectonic plates are shifting rapidly along Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier. While the military junta retains formal international recognition, it no longer maintains effective administrative control over large swathes of territory near Bangladesh. Instead, the Arakan Army (AA) has established itself as the primary authority across much of Rakhine State, including key stretches of the border and the adjacent coastline.

This transformation presents Dhaka with an acute strategic dilemma. Can a sovereign state successfully safeguard its national interests without engaging the actual authority controlling the territory right across its border?

The answer is clear. Bangladesh does not need to grant formal recognition to the Arakan Army, but it must adopt a clear-eyed approach to managing the reality of governance along its frontier. It is long overdue for Dhaka to embrace de facto diplomacy, meaning a pragmatic policy of functional engagement with non-state authorities that exercise effective territorial control.

Engagement is not recognition

The primary objection to dealing with the AA is usually framed in legalistic terms. Critics argue that engaging with an armed non-state group compromises the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. While that concern is understandable, it is fundamentally misplaced.

International statecraft has long distinguished between formal diplomatic recognition and practical engagement. Governments routinely interact with non-state entities when national interests dictate it. Humanitarian agencies negotiated with the Taliban long before their return to power in Kabul. Various international governments have engaged with Kurdish authorities in Iraq without legally challenging Iraqi sovereignty. Across Africa and Southeast Asia, states maintain open channels with armed groups to manage borders, establish ceasefires, and protect civilian populations.

This type of contact does not imply endorsement. It simply reflects a core reality of foreign policy: effective strategy must be rooted in facts on the ground rather than ideal preferences. Bangladesh's objective is not to arbitrate the future constitutional makeup of Rakhine State. Dhaka's priorities are to secure its borders, protect its citizens, prevent regional instability, and pave the way for the safe return of Rohingya refugees. Achieving these goals requires working with the actors who can actually deliver results. Right now, that means the AA.

The reality on the frontier

The strongest argument for functional engagement is that it is already happening. The successful repatriation of detained Bangladeshi fishermen in February 2026 proved that direct communication with the AA yields tangible outcomes. The transfer was handled smoothly and efficiently, bypassing traditional diplomatic friction. More importantly, it highlighted an undeniable truth: when incidents occur along the border, Naypyidaw is no longer the authority capable of resolving them.

Whether managing maritime boundary crossings, narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, or sudden security spikes, effective solutions require talking to the people holding the ground. Clinging to obsolete diplomatic protocol does not strengthen Bangladesh’s position; it weakens it. Successful foreign policy depends on agility, and ignoring the new reality only creates a vacuum for criminals and instability to exploit.

The overlooked maritime dimension

The rise of the AA extends far beyond land borders. For Bangladesh, this has rapidly evolved into a maritime security priority. The AA’s influence now stretches over significant portions of the Rakhine coastline along the northeastern Bay of Bengal. Consequently, shifts in AA-controlled zones directly impact fishing rights, maritime law enforcement, humanitarian responses, and coastal security.

Bangladeshi fishermen operate in waters immediately adjacent to these conflict zones. Maritime incidents involving fishing trawlers, undocumented migration, or trafficking rings will increasingly require communication with the authorities who physically control the coast. A lack of functional channels risks creating operational uncertainty and unnecessary naval tension. Strategically, the Bay of Bengal must now be viewed as an extension of the Rakhine security matrix. A narrow policy framework focused exclusively on land-based refugee repatriation is no longer sufficient.

The litmus test of Rohingya repatriation

Beyond immediate border stability, Bangladesh faces its most enduring challenge in the Rohingya crisis. Repatriation efforts have been stuck for years in a static cycle of negotiations, unfulfilled promises, and bureaucratic gridlock. While agreements have been signed and deadlines set, genuine progress remains elusive.

The ascendancy of the AA fundamentally rewrites this script. Any future repatriation pipeline will inevitably hinge on the internal power dynamics of Rakhine State. Whether observers welcome this development is irrelevant; the success of returns will depend entirely on the governance choices made by the AA.

This reality offers no grounds for complacency. Disquieting reports continue to emerge from Rakhine regarding movement restrictions, arbitrary detentions, and discrimination against remaining Rohingya communities. If the AA simply replicates the exclusionary policies of previous military regimes, the prospects for sustainable repatriation will evaporate.

The voluntary and dignified return of refugees relies entirely on trust in local security and fundamental rights. Therefore, Bangladesh’s engagement with the AA should never be an unconditional concession. Instead, it must be deployed as a calculated diplomatic tool to advance specific national goals.

Bangladesh’s untapped leverage

The AA currently faces a challenge distinct from typical insurgency. Winning a military campaign is one thing; governing a population is another. As the group transitions from combat to administration, it increasingly requires external legitimacy, cross-border economic ties, and humanitarian access. It cannot govern millions in absolute isolation from its neighbours, and that reality provides Bangladesh with substantial leverage.

Dhaka must use this opening to deliver a firm message: responsible governance is the prerequisite for meaningful cooperation and international acceptance. The protection of vulnerable civilian populations, specifically the Muslim communities remaining in Rakhine, must serve as the primary benchmark.

Bangladesh should insist on policies that guarantee freedom of movement, access to livelihoods, and protection from institutional discrimination. The treatment of these communities will be the ultimate measure of the AA's credibility. In this environment, governance, rather than battlefield success, will dictate their long-term legitimacy.

Learning from regional realities

Bangladesh is not alone in adapting to the fragmentation of Burma. Beijing remains deeply involved with a wide spectrum of local stakeholders to insulate its strategic investments and border corridors. Similarly, New Delhi has adjusted its approach to safeguard its regional connectivity projects and security interests, pivoting dynamically as local control shifts.

Across the region, pragmatism is overtaking protocol. Policymakers recognize that effective diplomacy requires dealing with those who wield real power on the ground rather than those who hold nominal titles in distant capitals. Diplomatic history is full of instances where states have engaged with adversaries they neither trusted nor recognized, simply because national survival demanded it.

The central issue for Dhaka is not whether the AA is a perfect partner. It is not. Nor should Bangladesh sever its ties with Burma’s internationally recognised government. The real question is whether Bangladesh can afford to ignore the authority that holds physical sway over the territory and coastline directly opposite its borders. The answer is increasingly no.

Strategic maturity requires a clear distinction between recognition and engagement, between ideological preferences and national necessity. Near Bangladesh’s southeastern frontier, the situation on the ground has evolved faster than the policies designed to manage it. The old status quo has vanished. Continuing to act as if nothing has changed will leave Bangladesh perpetually reactive. Managing borders, enforcing maritime security, and executing a credible plan for Rohingya repatriation must be grounded in contemporary geopolitical realities rather than diplomatic nostalgia.

 

Writer: Commodore Syed Misbah Uddin Ahmad, (C), NUP, ndc, afwc, psc, BN (retd), Director General, Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD). Email: misbah28686@gmail.com