Over ninety percent of Bangladesh's trade moves by sea, making distant crises a home economy issue

 

Bangladesh rarely comments publicly on developments involving distant maritime chokepoints. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on 22 July condemning threats to maritime navigation in the Red Sea and reaffirming freedom of navigation under international law, the message deserved attention.

Until now, for most of us, Bab el-Mandeb was little more than an unfamiliar name on an atlas. Yet this narrow stretch of water has suddenly become one of the world’s most consequential strategic corridors. Bangladesh’s diplomatic response was not merely a reaction to unfolding events in the Middle East; it reflected an understanding that in an interconnected maritime world, distant crises can quickly become matters of national economic interest.

Approximately one-third of worldwide container traffic typically passes through the Red Sea–Suez corridor

Bab el-Mandeb, which means ‘Gate of Grief’ in Arabic, lies between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden before leading into the Indian Ocean. Its narrowest point is just twenty kilometres wide, making it one of the most vital maritime chokepoints globally. All commercial ships traveling between Europe and Asia via the Suez Canal must pass through this crucial gateway. Its strategic importance has become even more pronounced as pressure on alternative maritime routes has intensified.

As conflicts surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted one of the world’s principal energy corridors, shipping has increasingly relied on the Red Sea route, making Bab el-Mandeb an even more indispensable passage. This is a classic lesson in maritime strategy: when one sea lane becomes contested, dependence shifts to another. The burden that once rested primarily on Hormuz is increasingly falling on Bab el-Mandeb. That is why the latest developments deserve attention.

Recent threats to commercial navigation—and the possibility of disruption—have once again reminded governments and markets alike how vulnerable this maritime corridor remains. Whether through actual attacks or the mere prospect of insecurity, uncertainty alone is enough to reshape commercial behaviour. Tankers alter course. Insurance premiums climb. Freight rates rise. Delivery schedules lengthen. Financial markets react long before a waterway is completely closed.

The world witnessed this during the Red Sea shipping crisis of 2023 and 2024. Commercial vessels were forced to divert around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of kilometres to their voyages

This is not simply another crisis in West Asia. It is a contest over the arteries of global commerce. History suggests that wars are often fought over territory, but great powers also compete over the routes connecting territories. Maritime trade remains the circulatory system of the global economy, and the world’s survival, let alone prosperity, depends upon a handful of narrow waterways remaining open.

Approximately one-third of worldwide container traffic typically passes through the Red Sea–Suez corridor. A significant portion of Gulf energy exports also depends on this route, especially when other routes face limitations. Modern supply chains rely on maritime transport being predictable, efficient, and cost-effective. Disrupting a key chokepoint can have far-reaching impacts well beyond the area where the disruption occurs.

The world witnessed this during the Red Sea shipping crisis of 2023 and 2024. Commercial vessels were forced to divert around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of kilometres to their voyages. Transit times increased by weeks. Freight costs surged. Supply chains slowed. What began as a regional security challenge evolved into a global economic problem. Today’s circumstances are potentially even more significant.

Geography continues to shape strategy. This also explains Bangladesh’s diplomatic position. Dhaka did not take sides in the conflict. Instead, it reaffirmed three enduring principles: respect for international law, the preservation of freedom of navigation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue.

For a maritime trading nation, this is not merely principled diplomacy. It is strategic self-interest—more than ninety percent of Bangladesh’s international trade moves by sea. Our ready-made garments reach European markets aboard merchant vessels. We import fuel, fertiliser, food grains, industrial machinery and industrial raw materials through global shipping networks. Every increase in freight costs eventually appears in factory production costs, consumer prices, and pressure on foreign exchange reserves.

Twenty-first-century technology has not diminished the importance of strategic geography; it has merely increased the economic costs of disrupting it. Twenty kilometres of water can still influence the global economy. For Bangladesh, several lessons emerge.

Maritime diplomacy must remain active and principled in defending freedom of navigation. Supply-chain resilience and strategic energy planning also deserve greater national attention. Continued investment in ports, maritime infrastructure, maritime domain awareness and naval capability is no longer simply a matter of national prestige; it is an essential component of economic security.

The Bay of Bengal does not exist in strategic isolation. It is connected to the wider Pacific and, through the Indian Ocean, to every major maritime chokepoint that sustains global trade.

Bab el-Mandeb is almost six thousand kilometres away from Bangladesh’s coast. However, in a connected maritime environment, physical distance is less significant. Any disturbance starting at the Gate of Grief ultimately impacts the Bay of Bengal, not through waves, but through increased prices, shipping delays, supply chain disruptions, and a reminder that Bangladesh’s economic well-being relies on safe and open seas. 

 

Writer: Commodore Syed Misbah Uddin Ahmad, (C), NUP, ndc, afwc, psc, BN (retd), Director General, Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD). Email: misbah28686@gmail.com